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CORPORATE WRONGDOING: INTERACTIONS OF
LEGAL MANDATES AND CORPORATE CULTURE
VINCENT DI LORENZO*
Abstract
In recent years, enforcement officials have imposed billions of
dollars in sanctions on all major U.S. financial institutions and many
major financial institutions abroad. Similar sanctions have been
imposed on nonfinancial institutions. The sanctions are the result of
findings of recurrent violations of law, as well as recidivism. Why have
existing regulatory standards and enforcement policies led to repeated
violations of law? Will the recent billion dollar sanctions deter future
wrongdoing?
This article explores these issues by examining the philosophy
motivating regulatory policy and action in the United States and
United Kingdom, using financial regulators as a case study. This
article discusses the interaction between two institutions that influence
corporate actors: government and corporate culture. That interaction
is examined through the lens of behavioral decision theory and
complexity theory. This article draws the conclusion that regulators in
the United States continue to be blind to cognitive influences on
corporate behavior. Enforcement policy in the United States has
ignored the multiple influences on corporate behavior that interact
and lead to nonlinear outcomes. The only change made in U.S.
enforcement strategy, if any, has been a greater emphasis on large
penalties to deter future misconduct. This emphasis continues to reflect
a linear, reductionist view of corporate behavior. By contrast,
regulators in the United Kingdom have begun to recognize cognitive
influences, and are rethinking their enforcement strategy based, in
part, on recognition of multiple influences on corporate decisionmaking. U.S. enforcement policy’s regulatory blindness appears likely
to lead to recurring issues of noncompliance.
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I.

Introduction

I.
II.

III.

Reports of violations of legal standards by mainstream
corporations crowd the news media. These reports document recurrent
violations of legal standards and recidivist corporate behavior.1 In
some industries, such as the financial services industry, legal violations
occur across large segments of the industry.2 Enforcement officials
have imposed billions of dollars in sanctions against all the major U.S.
financial institutions and many major financial institutions abroad.3
The large sanctions are the result of findings of recurrent violations of
law as well as recidivism.4 Why have existing regulatory standards and
enforcement policies led to repeated violations of law? Will the recent
1

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
3
See infra Part III.B.3.
4
See generally Gretchen Morgenson, At Big Banks, A Lesson Not Learned,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/
business/at-big-banks-a-lesson-not-learned.html
[https://perma.cc/2Z6QSFVR].
2
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billion dollar sanctions deter future wrongdoing? This article explores
these issues by examining the philosophy motivating regulatory policy
and action on the part of financial regulators in the United States and
United Kingdom.
Regulatory philosophy in the United States and United
Kingdom long reflected an assumption of corporate commitment to
law-abiding behavior.5 Mainstream corporations were viewed as
embracing an ethical obligation to comply with legal mandates.6 The
result was a light-touch approach to enforcement policy—a policy
relying on agreements to cease violations and not emphasizing the
imposition of civil penalties.7 When law-abiding behavior was absent
and a breach of legal standards was substantial, recurrent, or systemic,
only then were financial penalties imposed.8 More recently, regulatory
philosophy has been modified to embrace the view that corporate
actors are rational decision makers, choosing to comply with, evade, or
violate legal obligations based on cost-benefit evaluations.9 This
regulatory philosophy reflects a neoclassical economic view of costbenefit evaluations, under which it is assumed that corporate actors
will comply with legal requirements if all potential costs of
noncompliance exceed its benefits.10 In this scenario it is assumed that
corporate actors assess risk based on a full appreciation of all the shortterm and long-term consequences of their actions. The related
assumption is that corporate decisions are linear in nature, so that
increasing the size of fines, for example, will have a direct and
proportional impact on future decisions concerning legal compliance.11
This is both a reductionist and a linear view of human decision
making. The 2008 financial crisis has revealed flaws in both of these
viewpoints.12 This article applies decision theory and complexity
theory to explore why increased sanctions alone will likely not deter
5

See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19–20 (1992); cf. infra note 212
and accompanying text.
6
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
7
See id.; infra Part II.A–II.B.
8
See Margaret Cole, The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 266, 270 (2007); infra Part II.C.
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECO. 169, 177 (1968); infra Part II.B.
11
See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
12
See infra Part II.C.
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future corporate misconduct. Specifically, it explores the multiple
influences on corporate decision making. These influences include:
reason, reflected in cost-benefit evaluations; internal and external
market conditions; cognitive influences on decision making, including
the role of decision-making heuristics; and other influences such as
firm or industry corporate culture.13 This article also explores the
interaction of various influences on corporate behavior resulting in
nonlinear outcomes, and the likely effect of a heightened level of fines
on corporate behavior as this factor interacts with other influences on
future corporate decisions.14
Following this Introduction, Part II of this article examines the
assumptions of law-abiding behavior and rational decision making in
past formulations of regulatory standards and enforcement policy in
the United States and United Kingdom. The actions and policies of
financial services regulators provide a case study.15 In the 1970s and
1980s the academic community began to reject a reductionist view of
individual, consumer decision making, and later of corporate decision
making—a reductionist view that assumed compliance decisions were
determined solely by ethical commitment to law-abiding behavior and
later solely by reason.16 Market experience confirmed academic
criticisms; regulators, however, did not embrace this change in
viewpoint.17 Instead, regulatory authorities in the United States and
United Kingdom for many years, continued to base regulatory
standards and enforcement policy on a general assumption of
commitment to law-abiding behavior by mainstream corporations,
with outliers reined in through monetary sanctions.18 In recent years,
regulatory philosophy was modified to reflect the role of reason in
corporate compliance decisions.19 This regulatory philosophy assumes
full recognition of all long-term and short-term risks of misconduct by
corporate actors. The heightened reliance on financial penalties to
13

See infra Part III.B.1–III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
15
See infra Part II.A.
16
See generally Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law
Enforcement Response to the S&L Crisis, 59 FORD. L. REV. S155, S156
(1991).
17
See infra Part II.B.
18
Niel Willardson & Jackie Brunmeier, Types of Enforcement Actions, THE
REGION (Sept. 1, 2006), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/theregion/types-of-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/J6HE-LUWP]; see
infra Part II.B.
19
See infra Part II.C.
14
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deter future misconduct reflects this change. Nonetheless, regulatory
authorities in the United States remain blind to the multiple influences
on corporate decisions, including the effect of cognitive influences and
heuristics on cost-benefit evaluations, and more generally on
organizational behavior.20
Part III explores evidence that corporate decisions are
determined by multiple interacting influences. Government as an
institution, reflected in legal standards and enforcement policy and
actions, is one influence.21 Accepted business models, cognitive
factors, and behavioral tendencies are components of corporate culture
as an institution, and also play an important role in shaping corporate
decisions.22 Such influences interact in a dynamic system in which
outcomes are nonlinear. As a result, nongovernmental influences can
and have become dominant influences, overshadowing directives in
law and the influence of higher fines and similar sanctions.23
Regulatory agencies in the United States have largely ignored these
nongovernmental influences in shaping regulatory policy. The change,
if any, in U.S. enforcement strategy is rather a greater emphasis on
large penalties to deter future misconduct, which continues to reflect a
linear, reductionist view of corporate behavior. This regulatory
blindness seems likely to lead recurring issues of noncompliance.24 In
contrast, regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom are rethinking
their enforcement strategy based, in part, on recognition of multiple
influences on corporate decision making including cognitive
influences.25

20

See infra Part III.A.
Vincent Di Lorenzo, Business Ethics: Law as a Determinant of Business
Conduct, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 288 (2007); see infra Part III.B.1–III.B.2.
22
See generally Di Lorenzo, supra note 21.
23
See generally id.
24
See infra Part III.B.3. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with
JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic
Mortgages
(Nov.
19,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag-1237.html
[https://perma.cc/4JZH-2S4D].
25
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ENFORCEMENT FINANCIAL PENALTIES 5 (2009)
(UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7ZMS2NL]; infra Part III.B.4.
21
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Traditional Regulatory Philosophy

The academic literature has explored and debated the proper
goal of regulatory enforcement policy—whether it is restitution,
deterrence, and/or retribution.26 It has also examined individual
influences on corporate commitment to legal compliance.27 Scholarly
debate has focused on the cognitive and behavioral influences on
human decision making, but the debate has focused on consumer
decision making.28 Less attention has been paid to cognitive influences
on organizational behavior.29 More importantly, the academic
literature has largely ignored whether regulators have recognized
cognitive influences on organizational behavior. This article explores
this issue, and examines the changes in regulatory philosophy that are
necessary to induce greater corporate commitment to legal
compliance.
A.

The Law-Abiding Decision Maker

The traditional view of regulatory agencies in the financial
services industry was that industry members were committed to legal
compliance.30 Noncompliance was viewed as limited to situations
26

See generally Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 853 (2012) and articles cited therein.
27
See Tomas R. Giberson et al., Leadership and Organizational Culture:
Linking CEO Characteristics to Cultural Values, 24 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 123,
123–37 (June 2009).
28
See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–81 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR.
L. REV. 23, 43–56 (2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075–102 (2000); DAVID DE MEZA ET AL.,
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: A BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE (2008) (UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/
research/fsa-crpr69.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TV-N2WG] (discussing cognitive
biases identified in behavioral economics as they relate to a national strategy
for better financial capability among the population of the United Kingdom).
29
See infra notes 205–12 and accompanying text (discussing various
cognitive influences on legal compliance).
30
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 19–20 (describing most
regulators as being in the compliance camp—namely, that “most corporate
actors will comply with the law most of the time simply because it is the law
. . .” and embracing that viewpoint).
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involving rogue organizations or individuals, or occasional negligent
wrongdoing.31 Both regulatory requirements and enforcement policy
reflected this viewpoint.32 The American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance reflect this perspective.33 Section 2.01
recognizes that a corporation should have as “its objective the conduct
of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain.”34 However, “[e]ven if corporate profit and
shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation . . . [i]s
obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law . . . .” 35 This obligation to comply with the law
did not depend on cost-benefit evaluations.36 Section 2.01 was first
tentatively approved in 1984.37 Its objective was accepted by financial
services regulators.38
For example, in 1983 the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency
declined to impose explicit limitations on national banks’ real estate
lending activities, and rescinded then-current regulations that did
impose precise limits.39 This decision constrained industry-lending
practices solely by the general principles that unsafe and unsound
banking practices must be avoided and that underwriting practices
must be prudent.40 This principles-based approach relied on bank
management to determine which practices did not meet the safety and
soundness and prudence principles.41 The Comptroller justified this
decision on the following grounds:

31

Id. at 26.
Id. at 21.
33
See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 6.
34
Id. at § 2.01(a).
35
Id. at § 2.01(b)(1).
36
Id. at § 2.01 cmt. g (“Cost-benefit analysis may have a place in the state’s
determination whether a given type of conduct should be deemed legally
wrongful. Once that determination has been made, however, the resulting
legal rule normally represents a community decision that the conduct is
wrongful as such, so that cost-benefit analysis whether to obey the rule is out
of place.”)
37
See Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of
the ALI’s Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511 (1984).
38
Id. at 512.
39
Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698, 40,699–700
(Sept. 9, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7).
40
Id. at 40,700.
41
Id.
32
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[T]he Office believes that, in the interest of
facilitating national banks’ ability to respond to
market conditions, removal of the restrictions is
warranted. . . . Decisions concerning the forms and
terms of national bank lending are properly the
responsibility of each bank’s directorate and
management.42
Implicit in this approach was a view that mainstream financial
institutions were law-abiding actors and therefore would be committed
to legislative and regulatory mandates that imposed constraints in the
form of general principles.43 A similar principles-based approach to
regulation, and similar view of banking corporations as law-abiding
citizens, was embraced by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in
the United Kingdom.44
Based on the viewpoint of a law-abiding corporate actor,
enforcement policy responded to most violations through what has
been termed a light-touch approach.45 Under this approach, when a
violation was uncovered, the offender was required to agree to refrain
from further violations of law.46 Substantial fines or other sanctions
were not thought necessary to ensure future compliance on the part of
most industry members, including most violators, due to the
assumption that a law-abiding culture characterized most
organizations.47

42

Id. at 40,699.
Id.
44
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 4 (2007) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD7Y-WRJZ] (“We want to give
firms the responsibility to decide how best to align their business objectives
and processes with the regulatory outcomes we have specified . . . . Principlesbased regulation is not new . . . . However we see real benefits for firms,
markets and consumers . . . in tipping the balance of our approach towards a
greater reliance on principles . . . .”).
45
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATOR RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 88 (2009) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/turner_review.pdf [https://perma.cc/39E6-4HGN].
46
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FSA’S ROLE UNDER THE PAYMENT SERVICES
REGULATIONS 2009: OUR APPROACH 123–25 (2012) (UK),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/archive/fsa-psd-approach-latest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VND-JEE6].
47
See Cole, supra note 8, at 270.
43
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For example, the enforcement policy of U.S. federal bank
regulators has relied on informal agreements, formal agreements, and
cease and desist orders when regulators encountered examples of
noncompliance with legal mandates.48 Under this policy, when firms
failed to comply with legal mandates they faced an agreement or order
to cease the activities in question.49 Firms did not face fines for past
violations and, in fact, typically retained all the profits earned through
past practices conducted in violation of legal mandates.50
U.S. federal banking regulators’ actions in response to
examinations revealing unsafe or unfair mortgage lending activities
before the 2008 mortgage crisis provide a revealing case study. Federal
banking regulators rarely brought supervisory actions to address unfair
or unsafe mortgage lending practices.51 When an agency encountered
any legal violation, usually the only enforcement measure taken would
be an agreement with or order against an individual bank to stop
unsafe or unsound practices.52 When regulators would bring
48

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, PPM 5310-3, OCC POLICIES & PROCEDURE MANUAL 4–7 (2011).
49
Id. at 5.
50
Willardson & Brunmeier, supra note 18.
51
See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative
Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 95–98 (2012).
52
See Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor
Protection Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.
64–68 (2009) (testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency)
[hereinafter Dugan] (stating that most bank problems are resolved through the
supervisory process, without resort to an enforcement action, and that
enforcement actions, whether informal or formal, typically involve an
agreement or order to cease the unsafe or unsound practice with relatively few
civil money penalties being imposed against the banks). See also Willardson
& Brunmeier, supra note 18, for a description of the types of enforcement
actions utilized by the federal banking agencies. Regulatory actions related to
the mortgage crisis exemplify this light-touch approach. See Todd Davenport,
OCC’s New Predator Rule, AM. BANKER (Feb. 3, 2005),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/170_24/-241453-1.html
[https://perma.cc/ZW6U-AYHT] (explaining how the OCC defines antipredatory lending standards as a safety and soundness issue, and enforces
violations through a deficiency letter or in an examination report first,
followed by a safety-and-soundness order, the equivalent of a cease and desist
order, and lastly, for failure to comply, possible civil money penalties); Greg
Ip & Damian Paletta, Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage Meltdown, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117449440555444249
[https://perma.cc/G58J-TTJJ] (observing that federal banking agencies had
issued relatively few public disciplinary actions in the two years preceding the
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enforcement actions, such actions typically involved a written
agreement to correct past violations and, occasionally, a cease and
desist order.53 Both written agreements and cease and desist orders
merely outline corrective actions a financial institution’s management
and directors must take to address deficiencies in the institution’s
operations.54
This light-touch approach to enforcement by U.S. banking
agencies is also reflected in the “deferred prosecution agreement” and
“non-prosecution agreement” policies of the U.S. Justice Department
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).55 In such
agreements, no actions are commenced if firms investigate their own
past wrongdoing and promise to change their behavior.56 In fact, this
policy became the official policy of the Justice Department in 2008,
just as the financial crisis unfolded.57
In the United Kingdom, the FSA had embraced a similar,
light-touch enforcement policy for when noncompliance with legal
article’s publication, and that most discipline was in the form of cease-anddesist orders). Civil money penalties are available in addition to supervisory
actions and cease and desist orders, but are rarely imposed for consumer
violations generally, let alone for unfair mortgage practices specifically. Neil
Willardson & Jackie Brunmeier, Supervisory Enforcement Actions Since
FIRREA and FDICIA, THE REGION (Sept. 1, 2006), https://www.
minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/supervisory-enforcement-actionssince-firrea-and-fdicia [https://perma.cc/2YF5-DC29] (observing that between
1999 and 2005 U.S. bank regulators issued only one civil monetary penalty
attributable to consumer protection weaknesses).
53
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 97.
54
See Willardson & Brumeier, supra note 18 (discussing trends in civil
monetary penalties between 1989 and 2005 and finding that 1 percent of all
civil money penalties imposed between 1999 and 2005 were based on
consumer protection violations, while enforcement activity was most heavily
concentrated on cease and desist orders and written agreements).
55
See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Mark Filip to Heads of
Dept. Components U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RF2E-EL4X]; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATION
PROGRAM
(2016),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
enfcoopinitiative.shtml [https://perma.cc/RH4E-DXHR].
56
Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Policies Itself,
Prosecutors Use Softer Approach, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-prosecutorsare-lenient-as-companies-break-the-law.html
[https://perma.cc/YFM6K6DH].
57
See id.
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requirements was uncovered.58 Namely, the FSA’s policy provided
that when a firm acted promptly in taking remedial action agreed to
with its supervisors, the FSA could decide against taking formal
disciplinary action.59 If the firm did not act promptly, then FSA would
take disciplinary or other enforcement action.60
The light-touch approach in enforcement policy seemed
reasonable in an era in which regulatory policy assumed a law-abiding
corporate culture. The regulators’ primary roles were to (1) spot
violations of law, which were presumed to occur inadvertently or,
perhaps, through uncertainty arising from legal mandates that were in
the form of general principles, (2) bring the violations to the
corporation’s attention, and (3) secure a promise of future compliance.
These roles would, and should continue to, evolve as the assumptions
underlying corporate behaviors changed.
B.

The Rational Decision Maker

To some degree, the assumption of the law-abiding corporate
actor was being reconsidered as early as 1989.61 For example, in
response to the savings and loan crisis, the U.S. Congress significantly
increased the level of permissible civil penalties that banking
regulators could impose.62 When faced with repeated violations of law,
or significant and systemic violations, regulators did impose large
monetary sanctions, including civil penalties.63 When they did so,
regulatory policy assumed that substantial penalties would help to
deter further misconduct.64 However, deterrence was not the primary
aim of the sanctions imposed.65 Rather, monetary sanctions sought
58

See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE ENFORCEMENT GUIDE 5 (2009) (UK),
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/document/EG_20091101_20100
305.pdf?date=2009-12-06 [https://perma.cc/Y6UK-AQFG].
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. 101-73, § 907(a) 103 Stat. 183, 462–63 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(2)).
62
See id. (explaining that the former fine of $1,000 per day was modified to
provide for first-tier penalties of up to $5,000 per day, second-tier penalties of
up to $25,000 per day, and third-tier penalties of up to $1 million per day).
63
See Dugan, supra note 52, at 68–71.
64
See id. at 68.
65
See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC, N.Y. Attorney General,
NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement
to Reform Investment Practices: $1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes
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primarily to provide restitution, and, at times, to fund structural
changes in the industry.66 Nonetheless, regulators continued to rely
primarily on a light-touch approach to enforcement until the outbreak
of the 2008 mortgage crisis.67
The regulatory assumption of corporate ethical commitment to
law-abiding behavior was brought into question by market experience
in the 1980s and 1990s.68 Government estimates of the number of
savings and loan failures in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s
that were caused by insider fraud ranged from 25 to 40 percent.69
Some wrongdoing was criminal, as 1,100 criminal prosecutions of
individuals involved in major savings and loan fraud resulted in 839
convictions.70 Yet, financial regulators have exhibited sustained path
dependence. Apart from actions related to the savings and loan crisis, a
light-touch approach to regulation persisted, in spite of the wrongdoing
that led to the mortgage crisis of 2008.71
It is useful to compare the regulatory philosophy reflected in
regulators’ statements accompanying the 2002 industry-wide
settlements regarding the improper activities of research analysts in
investment banking firms, with the more recent statements
accompanying settlements made between 2012 and 2015. The 2002
settlements highlighted the structural changes in the industry as the
means to ensure future legal compliance.72 The main goals of the $1.4
billion monetary sanctions imposed in 2002 were to provide restitution
to investors and to fund some of the structural changes that would help
ensure future compliance with legal mandates.73 Contrary to what
Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), www.sec.gov/news/
press/2002-179.htm. [https://perma.cc/6GJU-3BSX].
66
Id.
67
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the light-touch
approach to enforcement).
68
See Green, supra note 16, at S156.
69
See id. at S162–S163
70
Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2011/04/14/business/20110414-prosecute.html
[https://perma.cc/4K4D-CCNU].
71
See supra note 52 and accompanying text (detailing the regulatory approach
leading up to the financial crisis).
72
See William H. Donaldson, Speech by Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Chairman:
Prepared for Delivery at SEC Press Conference Regarding Global Settlement
(Apr. 28, 2003), www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803whd.htm [https://
perma.cc/8R32-VL8N].
73
Id.
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might be assumed, deterrence of future wrongdoing was not, in fact,
emphasized as the purpose of the monetary sanctions.74 This reflects a
regulatory philosophy that continued to be shaped by the assumption
of a law-abiding corporate culture in the industry generally.
By contrast, in recent settlements U.S. regulators have
emphasized the expectation of a deterrent effect produced by
significant monetary sanctions.75 The sanctions seek to deter not only
the violator, but also other members of the industry.76 Accordingly,
while restitution remains a regulatory goal,77 deterrence has become an
equally important goal.78
The increased emphasis on deterrence reflects two underlying
changes in regulatory philosophy. One change is a rejection of the
assumption of a law-abiding corporate culture.79 Regulators now
recognize that corporations comply with, evade, or decide to violate
legal mandates based on cost-benefit evaluations.80 Commitment to
legal compliance will not be robust if the benefits of noncompliance
exceed its costs.81 This evaluation system reflects a view that the
decisions of corporate actors are entirely, or at least primarily,
determined by reason. Regulators have embraced the view that the
corporate actor will appreciate and weigh all the long-term and shortterm risks and benefits of a proposed course of action.82
Such a viewpoint ignores, among other influences, cognitive
influences on evaluation of risks and benefits. It also ignores the
concept of complexity, including the multiple influences on human
74

See id. (“[A]lthough the monetary relief secured in the settlement is
substantial . . . the losses that investors suffered . . . far exceeds the ability to
compensate them fully . . . . [T]he structural reforms required are, in my view,
more significant.”); Press Release, supra note 65.
75
See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing expected deterrent
effects of penalties imposed).
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See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing how the financial
penalties imposed are intended to deter other companies).
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See Donaldson, supra note 72.
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See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
79
See infra note 297 and accompanying text (suggesting that one bank’s
criminal actions are potentially indicative of other corporate banks).
80
See infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing one bank’s conscious
decision to commit thousands of violations despite many opportunities to
adhere to regulations).
81
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 44, at 2. The type of rational decision
making assumed to exist is cost-benefit evaluations in neoclassical economic
terms. See Becker, supra note 10, at 177.
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See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 44, at 10–13.
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behavior that interact to shape decisions.83 Instead, U.S. regulatory
philosophy continues to reflect a reductionist and linear view of human
decision making. Curiously, when U.S. financial regulators embraced
the view that corporate compliance decisions are influenced by costbenefit evaluations, they ignored the academic studies and market
evidence that called into question the neoclassical economic view of
cost-benefit evaluations. They ignored the evidence that had led to the
rise of behavioral decision theory.
C.

The Outcome: Recurrent and Recidivist
Corporate Behavior

Corporate actions in the financial services industry have
exhibited recurrent violations of law and recidivist behavior. First,
individual financial institutions have violated repeatedly particular
laws over extended periods of time,84 while others have violated
numerous legal standards.85 Second, numerous members of the
financial services industry have simultaneously violated laws.86 In
some cases, the wrongdoing appears to have become systemic.87 Third,
83

Complexity theory recognizes that an effect is often not the product of one
constant cause. Rather, it results from the interaction of many forces that are
constantly changing. Therefore, the existence and influence of each force is
not constant. See GREGOIRE NICOLIS & ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING
COMPLEXITY 6 (W.H. Freeman & Co. ed., 1989); Donald T. Hornstein,
Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 913,
917–18 (2005) (defining complexity theory as “the study of many actors and
their interactions”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 110, 113–14 (1991) (applying the concept of complexity to the
interaction of the multiple justices on the U.S. Supreme Court); J.B Ruhl &
Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States, 30
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 417–18 (1997) (explaining that complexity theory’s
main properties consist of “the behavior of a system” described “according to
the community of its components . . . , mechanics of evolution in the system
. . . [and] overall direction of change”).
84
See Michael Corkery, Finra Fines Citigroup Over Acts by Analysts, N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Nov.
24,
2014,
1:20
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http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/citigroup-fined-15-million-forfailing-to-properly-supervise-analysts/ [https://perma.cc/8N92-AF34].
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industry members have demonstrated recidivist behavior by repeating
violations after being subject to significant sanctions, or failing to
comply with the terms of earlier settlements.88
There are many recent examples of recurrent violations of law.
In 2012, HSBC admitted to violations of both money laundering laws
and laws prohibiting the transfer of funds for countries subject to U.S.
economic sanctions.89 These violations occurred from 2006 to 2010.90
HSBC agreed to forfeit $1.256 billion and to pay $665 million in civil
penalties.91 Assistant Attorney General Breuer noted that “[t]he record
of dysfunction that prevailed at HSBC for many years was
astonishing.” 92 Also in 2012, British bank Standard Chartered settled
with the Justice Department and other regulators for violations of U.S.
laws prohibiting transfer of funds for countries subject to U.S.
economic sanctions.93 The violations occurred over a period of years.94
The Justice Department described the violations as deliberate and
flagrant, and the bank had also made misleading statements to
regulators to conceal its misconduct.95 It agreed to pay $227 million,
and the settlement required it to remediate anti-money-laundering
compliance problems.96 At the same time, the Federal Reserve Board
assessed a civil penalty of $100 million against Standard Chartered,
and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
announced a $132 million settlement with Standard Chartered based
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See id. (discussing the $43.5 million settlement of 10 financial firms for the
violation of FINRA’s research rules in 2014, many of which were part of a
similar settlement in 2003 for the same violation of FINRA’s research rules).
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on the same violations.97 Standard Chartered agreed to pay an
additional $300 million fine in August 2014 to the New York State
Department of Financial Services for continuing deficiencies in its
computer systems that “failed to flag wire transfers from parts of the
world considered vulnerable to money laundering.”98
Then, in 2013, Royal Bank of Scotland settled with U.S.
regulators for violating U.S. laws imposing economic sanctions and
agreed to pay $100 million.99 The bank concealed the identities of
clients in at least 3500 transactions with the knowledge of senior
employees, including the heads of money laundering and global
banking services for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.100
BNP Paribas settled with the Justice Department in 2014 for
violating U.S. laws prohibiting the transfer of funds for countries
subject to U.S. economic sanctions.101 The violations occurred from at
least 2004 through 2012, and BNP Paribas went to elaborate lengths to
conceal prohibited transactions and deceive U.S. authorities.102
Most recently, in 2015 Crédit Agricole agreed to sanctions
totaling more than $787.3 million to settle charges brought by the U.S.
Attorney’s Office of the District of Columbia, the Federal Reserve, the
Treasury Department, and the New York Department of Financial
97

Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Board Issues Consent Cease and Desist Order, and Assesses Civil Money
Penalty Against Standard Chartered PLC and Standard Chartered Bank (Dec.
10, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/
20121210a.htm [https://perma.cc/V4X9-HG2L].
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Nonprosecution Agreements, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:53
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/standard-chartered-extendsdeferred-prosecution-agreements-for-3-years/ [https://perma.cc/9R77-T3BX].
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BANKER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_237/
rbs-to-settle-foreign-sanctions-probe-for-100-million-1064215-1.html
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Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Reaches Largest Ever
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30,
2014),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
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Services for violations of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act and the Trading With the Enemy Act.103 The violations
occurred between August 2003 and September 2008.104 Similarly, in
2015 Commerzbank agreed to pay $1.5 billion to settle charges that it
had violated the Bank Secrecy Act, which targets money laundering,
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which targets
transfer of funds for countries subject to economic sanctions.105 These
violations occurred from 2002 to 2008.106 Also in 2015, Deutsche
Bank settled charges that it had violated the economic sanctions laws
and agreed to pay $258 million to the Federal Reserve and the New
York Department of Financial Services.107 The violations occurred
from 1999 to 2006.108
Presently, charges for violations of money laundering and/or
economic sanctions laws brought by U.S. authorities are pending
against Société Générale and Unicredit.109 All of these actions are
evidence of not only recurrent violations, but also violations by
numerous members of the financial services industry.
Citigroup provides another example of recurrent violations of
law as well as recidivist conduct.110 Citigroup has been charged with
repeated violations of federal securities laws regulating research
analysts’ conduct.111 Citigroup was fined by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2014 for violating laws concerning
research analysts’ communications with respect to the planned Toys
103
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“R” Us initial public offering.112 In 2013, Citigroup was charged when
an analyst shared unpublished research about Apple with hedge funds
and a fund manager.113 It was similarly charged in 2012 for a research
analyst sharing nonpublic information concerning Facebook, and in
2011 for violating FINRA rules concerning research analysts’ assisting
issuers in the preparation of road show presentations.114 Citigroup has
also settled with regulators for violating U.S. laws in actions involving
misrepresentations in the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS), mortgage servicing violations, manipulation of foreign
currency markets, and manipulation of LIBOR and other
benchmarks.115
Additional recent violations of law involving research analyst
activities are further evidence of recidivist conduct. In 2003, the SEC,
state prosecutors, and market regulators reached a $1.4 billion
settlement with ten firms, including Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit
Suisse First Boston, and UBS Warburg, for actions alleging conflicts
of interest on the part of stock research analysts, as well as fraud and
misrepresentations, in violation of federal law.116 Ten years later, ten
firms, including many of the same banks charged in 2003, were
charged by FINRA with the same violations regarding conflicts of
interest and research analysts’ communications with potential
investment banking clients.117 FINRA concluded that flouting these
securities regulations was the norm for every one of the firms.118
Recurrent violations have also occurred across large segments
of the industry with respect to particular legal standards. Investigators
in the RMBS Working Group probed misrepresentations in mortgage

112
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bond sales leading to the 2008 mortgage crisis.119 They found
improper actions occurred “not only occasionally, but in the end, with
almost every deal examined.”120
For example, Citigroup’s $7 billion settlement was based on
misrepresentations that violated federal laws in various RMBS
offerings in 2006 and 2007.121 Settlements were also reached in
November 2013 for similar violations by J.P. Morgan Chase and two
institutions it had acquired, Bear Sterns and Washington Mutual.122
Likewise, Bank of America and two institutions it had acquired,
Merrill Lynch and Countrywide Financial, reached settlements in
August 2014 for similar federal securities law violations.123 J.P.
Morgan Chase and Credit Suisse also settled with the SEC and agreed
to pay more than $400 million combined for misleading investors in
offerings of residential mortgage-backed securities.124 J.P. Morgan
Chase was charged with misconduct in its 2006 RMBS offering, while
Bear Stearns, the company it later acquired, was charged with
violations in 156 different RMBS transactions issued from 2005 to
2007.125 Credit Suisse was charged with violations in seventy-five
119

See Jody Shenn, Flaws Found in ‘Almost Every’ Mortgage-Bond Deal as
Crash Began, 102 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 967 (2014).
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1989) (containing the civil penalty provision of the FIRREA).
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misrepresentations).
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different RMBS transactions issued from 2005 to 2010.126 Following a
trial, Nomura Securities and Royal Bank of Scotland were found liable
in May 2015 for misleading Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in their sales
of mortgage-backed securities.127 Judge Cote wrote in a May 11, 2015
ruling in the case that “[t]he magnitude of falsity, conservatively
measured, is enormous.”128
A distinct industry-wide example of improper conduct
involves mortgage servicers’ activities. In 2012, the Justice
Department, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
forty-nine attorneys general, and other federal agencies reached a $25
billion settlement with the nation’s five largest mortgage servicers:
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citibank, and Ally
Financial (formally GMAC).129 This was to resolve violations of state
and federal law with respect to loan servicing and foreclosure
practices.130 A year later recidivist conduct was uncovered.131 Three of
the five institutions subject to the settlement had failed to fully comply
with its requirements, based on investigation by a court appointed
monitor.132 In 2015, the Comptroller of the Currency again found
noncompliance with earlier foreclosure settlements on the part of J.P.
Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and other banks, and restricted their
purchases of mortgage servicing rights.133 In a separate settlement
involving Ocwen Financial Corp. and the New York State Department
of Financial Services, a 2012 examination revealed “widespread
noncompliance with the 2011 [Settlement] Agreement” aimed at
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remediating mortgage servicing deficiencies.134 Due to these
violations, Ocwen agreed to host a monitor for up to three years and
pay $150 million in restitution.135
A final example of both recurrent violation of law and
violations by numerous industry members is provided by industry
manipulation of both foreign exchange rates and the LIBOR rates.
Four banks—Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Barclays, and Royal Bank
of Scotland—agreed with the Justice Department to plead guilty to
felony charges for manipulating the foreign currency exchange market
and to pay $2.5 billion in criminal fines.136 The wrongdoing occurred
from 2007 to 2013.137 The Federal Reserve imposed a separate fine on
the four banks of $1.6 billon, as well as a fine on UBS, which
committed similar manipulation of LIBOR rates.138 Barclays settled
related claims with U.S. and U.K. authorities and agreed to pay a
combined penalty of approximately $1.3 billion.139 Adding earlier
settlements with U.S. and European regulators, the five banks have
been subjected to fines and penalties of nearly $9 billion.140
U.S. and European regulators have imposed $6 billion in fines
on ten banks and brokerage firms for manipulating the London
interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and the European interbank offered
rate (EURIBOR).141 Three additional banks—HSBC, J.P. Morgan
Chase, and Crédit Agricole—have been similarly charged, but refused
to settle.142 Barclays, for example, admitted to misconduct between
2005 and 2009 and agreed to pay both a $160 million penalty in its
agreement with the Justice Department and a $200 million penalty in
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its agreement with the CFTC.143 One scheme flourished from 2005 to
2007 and continued sporadically through 2009.144 A second scheme
took place from August 2007 to January 2009.145 United Bank of
Switzerland and its various subsidiaries agreed to a total of more than
$1.5 billion in penalties and disgorgement with U.S., U.K., and Swiss
authorities for LIBOR manipulation from 2006 through 2009.146 UBS
Securities Japan also agreed to plead guilty to felony wire fraud.147
Deutsche Bank has been ordered to pay a $2.5 billion fine to settle
investigations by U.S. and U.K. regulators for rigging LIBOR
benchmark rates from 2003 to 2011.148 In the LIBOR manipulation
investigations the Justice Department concluded that, “certain
institutions condoned a culture of illegal behavior.”149
These many examples of corporate misconduct demonstrate
the financial services industry’s pattern of recurrent violations of law
and recidivist behavior.
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A Modest Evolution in Regulatory Philosophy
A.

Recognition of Complexity and Behavioral
Influences in Consumer Decision Making

There is an interesting contrast between the evolving view of
financial industry regulators with respect to consumer decision-making
and the static view of these regulators with respect to corporate
decision making. In the realm of consumer decision-making, U.S.
regulators in recent years went to great lengths to document the
multiple influences on consumer decisions, including cognitive
limitations and decision-making heuristics.150 As a result, regulatory
policy was modified in recognition of these influences and the
resultant limits to self-protection by consumers.151 However, in the
realm of corporate decision making, multiple influences including
cognitive influences and heuristics have been ignored. The same
cannot be said of financial industry regulators in the United Kingdom.
There, cognitive influences on both consumer decisions and corporate
decisions have been acknowledged, and regulatory policy, including
enforcement policy, is evolving in response.152
Before 2008, the regulatory approach to consumer protection
relied on a rational decision-maker model.153 Namely, consumers
could protect themselves against unfair or unsafe financial products by
weighing all the risks and the benefits of the product in question.154
Cost-benefit evaluation was considered the basis of consumer
decisions, with the law intervening merely to provide full and early
disclosure in order to allow proper cost-benefit evaluations.
Studies, however, confirmed that many consumers are unable
to protect themselves in the mortgage market that emerged in the last
decade.155 The Federal Reserve Board recognized this state of affairs
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when it modified real estate lending regulations in July 2008.156
Similarly, the FSA recognized that behavioral biases on the part of
consumers have a significant impact on what can be achieved through
disclosure, education, and counseling.157 Both regulators, therefore,
considered greater product intervention.158
The Federal Reserve Board and the FSA recognized that the
inability of consumers to protect themselves results from a
combination of market characteristics and behavioral barriers as they
interact in the decision-making process of individual consumers. The
factors identified by one or both agencies include: (1) the market
characteristic of limited transparency, particularly in the market for
subprime loans, which prevents comparison shopping;159 (2) the
market and cognitive characteristic that innovative mortgage products
are too complex to be understood and properly evaluated by
consumers, a barrier exacerbated by inexperience;160 (3) the behavioral
INTERVENTION 16 (2011) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/
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can be difficult for consumers to compare products, in part due to opaque
charging structures).
160
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,524–25 (using adjustable rate
mortgages as an example of a nontraditional loan product which “tend to be
complex for consumers”); FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FCA’S USE OF
TEMPORARY PRODUCT INTERVENTION RULES 10 (2012) (UK) (explaining that
some financial products or features may be “so complex that most consumers
. . . would be unable to understand, or would have difficulty understanding the
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characteristic of limited shopping caused by the combined effect of
limited transparency, complexity, and the cost of comparison
shopping;161 (4) persistent negative beliefs concerning credit
availability and ability to qualify for loans (pessimism bias) that
prevent some consumers from shopping for more favorable terms;162
and (5) the inability of consumers to properly evaluate additional
information that might be disclosed, in part due to complexity but also
due to decision-making heuristics, including limited focus.163
Focusing on behavioral and cognitive barriers to consumer
self-protection, regulators recognized that market barriers to consumer
self-protection combine with additional psychological barriers that
surface from invalid borrower beliefs.164 One such belief is that lenders
are required by law to provide the best possible rate on loans.165
Another belief is that lenders or brokers will offer suitable products.166
The FSA found that consumers assume that no firm will identify
options that are not broadly appropriate for them.167 This leads to
limited comparison shopping or no comparison shopping.168

risks or features of the product they are purchasing”); FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
supra note 155, at 26 (positing that the complexity of financial products plus
the behavioral biases of consumers can result in misleading views about a
product).
161
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525; Patricia McCoy, Rethinking
Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 123, 140–41
(observing that fees and interest rates are disclosed after the consumer pays a
nonrefundable application fee).
162
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525.
163
Id.
164
See MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW, supra note 158, at 72–75; CONSUMER
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 158, at 8.
165
The Fannie Mae National Housing Survey found that more than 40 percent
of borrowers generally, almost two-thirds of African-American borrowers,
and 75 percent of Spanish speaking Hispanic borrowers did not know that this
statement was false. FANNIE MAE, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S
HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS: 2003 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 7
(2003),
http://fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/housingsurvey/pdf/
survey2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5J-SYWC].
166
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW: DISTRIBUTION AND
DISCLOSURE 12 (2010) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp10_28.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4LY-RN26].
167
See id.
168
See id. The FSA reported that consumers see intermediaries more as a
means for accessing available produces because they assume all firms will
offer appropriate options implying no need to comparison shop. See id.

232

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

VOL. 36

Third, borrows tend to pessimistically believe that they have
poorer credit quality than they actually do.169 A Freddie Mac
Consumer Credit Survey found that 30 percent of white borrowers,
approximately one-third of Latino borrowers, and approximately 50
percent of African-American borrowers who had good credit believed
they had poor credit.170 As a result consumers will accept a subprime
mortgage at a higher interest rate, carrying higher fees and a
prepayment penalty because they believe they would not qualify for a
prime mortgage or a non-prime mortgage with a lower interest rate and
fee structure.171
A fourth belief that prevents consumer self-protection is the
misconception among low-income borrowers and subprime borrowers
that there are few alternatives available to them, either due to fewer
lenders willing to make loans in their communities or due to the lower
quality of their credit history.172 Both U.S. and U.K. regulatory
authorities uncovered this belief.173
Pessimism concerning credit quality and/or availability of
credit may be characterized as pessimism bias, the opposite of the
optimism bias displayed in most situations by most individuals.174
Pessimism bias is most prevalent among low-income and minority
169
See Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad
Credit, Wealth and Race, 45:2, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 223, 229–30 (2001)
(citing FREDDIE MAC, 1999 CONSUMER CREDIT SURV. (1999)).
170
See id.; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY:
APPROACH TO REGULATION 24 (2011) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.
uk/pubs/events/fca_approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/3222-72MR] (stating there
can be opportunities for firms to exploit consumer behavior such as lack of
confidence or knowledge in retail markets).
171
See Ards & Myers, supra note 169, at 238.
172
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY
DEV. & RESEARCH, FR-5180-F-02, RESPA: REGULATORY IMPACT AND
INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS 2–102 (2008), http://www.
hud.gov/offices/hsg/ramh/res/impactanalysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GLJ82RA] (“Finally, households in low-income and minority neighborhoods may
perceive that there are fewer opportunities to find a mortgage because of a
lack of prime lenders in their neighborhoods . . . . Subprime borrowers are
more likely to believe that they have fewer opportunities because of their
credit circumstances and brokers may reinforce their perceptions.”).
173
See generally FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW:
STAGE 2 REPORT 9–10 (2008) (UK), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/MER2_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5E-2YK2] (explaining that
subprime consumers did not see traditional lenders as a realistic option).
174
See id.
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borrowers.175 Regulators recognized that all of these beliefs undermine
self-protection by serving as barriers to comparison shopping.176
Consumer pessimism leads to an emotional response to a favorable
credit decision that undermines rational decision making. Relief is
triggered when a loan application is approved, and fear is triggered that
if the particular loan offered is not accepted, regardless of its terms, no
other lender or loan will be available.177
A final barrier to consumer self-protection recognized by
regulators concerns the manner in which consumers make decisions in
the mortgage market.178 There has been a great deal of research
concerning decision-making heuristics, including decision making in
the mortgage loan process.179 For example, regulators have recognized
limited focus as a decision-making heuristic among consumers.180 The
Federal Reserve Board noted:
Consumers considering obtaining a typically complex
subprime mortgage loan may simplify their decision
by focusing on a few attributes of the product or
service that seem most important. A consumer may
focus on loan attributes that have the most obvious
and immediate consequence such as loan amount,
down payment, initial monthly payment, initial
interest rate, and up-front fees . . . . These consumers,
therefore, may not focus on terms that may seem less
immediately important to them such as future
increases in payment amounts or interest rates,
prepayment penalties, and negative amortization.
They are also not likely to focus on underwriting
practices such as income verification, and on features
such as escrows for future tax and insurance
obligations . . . . Thus, consumers may unwittingly
accept loans that they will have difficulty repaying.181
175

See id. at 10.
See id. at 5.
177
Id.
178
See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 766–806 (2006).
179
See id.
180
See generally Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg at 44,525–26.
181
Id. (footnotes omitted). Research on the part of the Federal Reserve staff
has found, for example, that 40 percent of borrowers with income less than
$50,000—corresponding to the bottom half of the income distribution of
176
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Similarly, the FSA concluded that many consumers focus only on
short-term costs, and are therefore seduced by an attractive initial
interest rate.182 This is true even among relatively sophisticated
borrowers, who focused on the initial monthly payment.183
As a result of the many consumer barriers to self-protection,
regulatory authorities in the United States and United Kingdom have
recognized that modifications in the timing or manner of disclosures
will not lead to effective self-protection. The U.S. General
Accountability Office came to this conclusion as early as 2004, after
discussions with federal officials and consumer advocates.184 It found
that due to complexity in the terms of non-prime mortgages and
borrowers’ lack of financial education and sophistication, greater
consumer education and even clear and transparent disclosures would
be of limited effectiveness in decreasing the incidence of predatory
lending practices.185 The FSA expressed similar doubt that increased
disclosure will change consumer behavior.186

ARM borrowers—are unaware of their per-period caps on their ARM
mortgages, 53 percent are unaware of their lifetime cap, and 40 percent are
unaware of the index of their ARM. By contrast, 13 percent of borrowers with
income exceeding $150,000—the top income decile of ARM borrowers—are
unaware of their per period caps, while 21 percent are unaware of their
lifetime cap, and 8 percent are unaware of the index. See BRIAN BUCKS &
KAREN PENCE, FED. RESERVE BD., DO HOMEOWNERS KNOW THEIR HOUSE
VALUES AND MORTGAGE TERMS 20, 36 (2006), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603abs.html [https://perma.cc/7EJH-7PRK].
182
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEW: RESPONSIBLE
LENDING 57–58 (2010) (UK), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/
consultation/fsa-cp10-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KUH-WJRR].
183
Id.; see also FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 155, at 26 (describing how
consumers do not focus on costs that will arise later such as mortgage exit
fees or mortgage arrears charges).
184
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 040280, CONSUMER
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN
COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 94–98 (2004), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/160/157511.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLU2-USC7].
185
Id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 101, 127–30 (2008) (finding evidence of a lack of
understanding of mortgage loan terms and products on the part of consumers).
186
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 182, at 73–74.
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Indeed, additional disclosures may be counterproductive due
to information overload, and, in any event, are likely to be ineffective
due to limited focus.187 As the Federal Reserve concluded:
Disclosures describing the multiplicity of features of a
complex loan could help some consumers in the
subprime market, but may not be sufficient to protect
them against unfair loan terms or lending practices.
Obtaining widespread consumer understanding of the
many potentially significant features of a typical
subprime product is a major challenge. If consumers
do not have a certain minimum level understanding of
the market and products, disclosures for complex and
infrequent transactions may not effectively provide
that minimum understanding. Moreover, even if all of
a loan’s features are disclosed clearly to consumers,
they may continue to focus on a few features that
appear most significant. Alternatively, disclosing all
features may “overload” consumers and make it more
difficult for them to discern which features are most
important.188
It is interesting to note that regulators in the United Kingdom
similarly have recognized not only the multiple influences on
consumer decisions, but also that these influences interact. The
Financial Conduct Authority explained that it:
will base its regulatory interventions on a deeper
understanding of underlying commercial and
behavioural drivers and the often multiple causes of
poor outcomes for consumers. This will involve
analysis of often complex chains of interaction.189
All of these statements and actions regarding regulatory policy
reflect recognition of the multiple influences on consumer decisions,
including, but not limited to, cognitive barriers and decision-making
187

Vincent Di Lorenzo, Barriers to Market Discipline: A Comparative Study
of Regulatory Reforms, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 517, 527 (2012).
188
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,526 (citation omitted); see also
Willis, supra note 178, at 767 (discussing cognitive responses to information
overload).
189
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 170.
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heuristics. Has a similar recognition occurred with respect to corporate
decision making?
B.

Regulatory Blindness Toward Corporate Decision
Making

Regulators have recognized both the market realities and
behavioral barriers that often prevent effective decision making on the
part of consumers.190 Regulators in the United States have not,
however, explicitly recognized behavioral barriers to proper risk
assessment on the part of corporate actors. Nor have they recognized
the interaction of multiple influences on corporate behavior. As a
result, U.S. regulators continue to emphasize larger and larger fines as
the key to deterrence.191 This deterrence strategy is based on the
continuing assumption that corporate decisions reflect a complete
evaluation of all short-term and long-term risks, and are determined by
such cost-benefit evaluations.
1.

Influences on Industry Compliance
Decisions

Some studies of organizational behavior have embraced
complexity theory as descriptive of decision making in business
organizations.192 Kagan, Cunningham, and Thornton’s quantitative and
qualitative analyses led them to conclude that “theories of corporate
environmental behavior that focus on a single variable—whether legal,
economic or attitudinal—are almost always doomed to be incomplete
and inadequate.”193 Legal standards, policies, and actions are just one
set of influences on corporate behavior. Another influence is the
precision of the governing legal standards.194 Yet another influence is
190

See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,524–26.
See infra note 298 and accompanying text. See generally Part III.B.3.
192
See, e.g., Robert Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental
Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 76–
78 (2003). See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage
Unethical Conduct in the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L.
765, 770–71 (summarizing studies and perceived influences on corporate
behavior).
193
Kagan, supra note 192, at 76–78.
194
See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Business Ethics: Law As A Determinant of
Business Conduct, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 288 (2007) (“[I]n a regime with a
vague legal standard the influence of law on corporate conduct is weakest.”);
191
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the frequency of inspections and sanctions.195 Studies and
commentators have offered a difference of opinion on the significance
of the size of legal sanctions on corporate decisions.196 However, many
studies have provided support for the influence of the frequency of
inspections, and the frequency and severity of sanctions.197 This debate
is part of a broader debate about whether enforcement policy should
assume rational decision making by corporate actors—rational
decision making viewed through the lens of neoclassical economic
analysis.198
However, factors influencing legal compliance are not limited
to the nature of the legal mandate and the severity and frequency of
sanctions.199 Legal compliance is also influenced by market realities,
including prevailing business models that shape corporate decisions.
One business model bases corporate decisions on cost-benefit

Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles-and RulesBased Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 91, 99 (2003) (“[A] relatively large
experimental literature provides evidence that the aggressiveness of reporting
decisions increases with the imprecision of the relevant reporting standard.”).
195
See Peter J. May, Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative
Bases, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 41, 45 (2004) (summarizing prior studies
regarding the influence of various factors, such as inspection frequency and
consistency, perceived legitimacy of regulations, reputation, and ability to
comply including costs and competitive effects).
196
See John Braitwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of
Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 7, 35 (1991) (finding little
support for the additive or multiplicative effects of the certainty of detection,
certainty of punishment, and severity of punishment).
197
See Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement
Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 177,
199–202 (1993); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and
Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 209, 237 (1989); Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 95–102 (studying
the mortgage market in the period 2002–2008 in which benefits of
noncompliance or evasion outweighed costs of noncompliance when
sanctions were infrequent); Di Lorenzo, supra note 193, at 782–803
(discussing cost-benefit evaluations of legal sanctions in the securities
industry, and comparing it to cost-benefit evaluations in the banking industry
and the industry’s compliance record under the Community Reinvestment
Act).
198
See generally Becker, supra note 10.
199
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 770–71 n.17.
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evaluations.200 Legal mandates are strictly followed or creatively
ignored as a result of an evaluation of the benefits and risks of
noncompliance.201 In other words, resolute legal compliance is not a
given, but rather a determination made by industry actors in a
particular context. Frequency and level of legal sanctions contribute to
the costs of non-compliance, but are not the only costs industry actors
encounter.202 Another cost is the adverse impact on the reputation of
the corporation.203
Cost-benefit evaluation is not the only business model
influencing corporate behavior. A related business model bases
decisions on the goal of generating substantial and rising short-term
profits to meet the demands of investors and to sustain and increase the
corporation’s stock price.204
In addition to the nature of the legal mandate, the nature of
enforcement policy, and relevant market realities, corporate decisions
are influenced by cognitive limitations and decision-making
heuristics.205 These limit a complete recognition of long-term risks.206
Finally, personality traits of corporate actors have an influence on
corporate behavior.207 Personality traits trigger emotional responses to
market conditions and influence the overall corporate culture.208
Market realities, including accepted business models, cognitive
limitations, and heuristics, as well as personality traits of corporate
actors, all combine to create a corporate culture. This corporate culture
is an important institutional influence on corporate behavior—an
200

See Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 91–100 (studying corporate decisions
based on cost-benefit evaluations in the 2008 mortgage crisis and the period
preceding it).
201
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 103; Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 784.
202
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 784.
203
See May, supra note 195, at 48. Reputational concerns enhance the sense
of obligation to comply. Id.
204
See Sean Silverthorne, The High Risks of Short-Term Management, HARV.
BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 11, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs.
edu/item/the-high-risks-of-short-term-management [https://perma.cc/FH4MAFAJ].
205
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 788; Susanna K. Ripken, Predictions,
Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate
Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 958–68 (2005)
(explaining the impact of several decision-making heuristics on corporate
decision making).
206
See Di Lorenzo, supra note 192, at 788.
207
See Giberson et al., supra note 27, at 123–37.
208
Id. at 133–35.
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influence distinct and perhaps more important than the influence of
government standards, policies and actions.209
Behavioral barriers to effective risk assessment among
industry actors have been the subject of study far less frequently than
behavioral barriers among consumers.210 The studies conducted have
found no difference between the use of decision-making heuristics in
group decision making and organizational behavior in corporations.211
Accordingly, regulators must recognize that cognitive limitations and
decision-making heuristics affect industry actors as much as they
affect the general public.212
Regulators must also recognize complexity in corporate
decisions, specifically the interaction of multiple influences on
corporate decisions. These multiple influences on corporate behavior
can skew cost-benefit evaluations in favor of “creative compliance,”
“creative non-compliance,” or, at times, in favor of violation of clear
legal mandates.213
Three decision-making heuristics that can play a significant
role in corporate decisions on compliance with regulatory mandates
are: skewed risk perception, simplified decision making, and the
representativeness heuristic.
Skewed risk perception is the inverse relationship between
perceptions of risks versus benefits.214 When a significant benefit (e.g.,
substantial profits) is perceived to result from evasion or
noncompliance with legal mandates, then any risk posed by the
209

See Michael D. Watkins, What Is Organizational Culture? And Why
Should We Care?, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 15, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/05/what-is-organizational-culture
[https://perma.cc/
MU9D-8WHH].
210
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 540.
211
Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1714 (2003); see, e.g., JAMES
MONTIER,
BEHAVING
BADLY
3–9
(Feb.
2,
2006),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php
[https://perma.cc/XJ7N-8W98]
(studying professional fund managers and revealing over-optimism,
confirmatory bias, representativeness, framing, and loss aversion).
212
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 540.
213
Id.; see Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541 (finding that complexity can
cause people to use simplified decision making, which does not maximize
their utility). For a discussion of violations of state law by U.S. banking
institutions in mortgage foreclosure proceedings, and violations of federal law
in consumer bankruptcy proceedings, see Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and
Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 146 (2008).
214
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541.
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activity (e.g., legal sanction) is viewed as a low probability risk.215
This holds true regardless of the actual objective level of risk that a
disinterested third-party would perceive.216
When individuals face complexities arising from many
interacting variables and uncertainties regarding future outcomes,
including potential initiation of lawsuits and exposure to liability, they
resort to a simplified decision-making strategy. 217 In making such
decisions, individuals give the highest value to the individual’s most
important choices,218 such as preserving or increasing profits, and
ignore risks they perceive as low probability, such as civil penalties
imposed by regulators. 219
The representativeness heuristic is a tendency to judge the
probability of an event based on the extent to which the event “is . . .
similar in essential properties to its parent population” and “reflects the
salient features of the process by which it is generated.”220 Similarity
in salient features leads to a conclusion of similar probability.221 In
turn, when two events are judged or thought to be dissimilar in salient
features, then the probability of the same outcome is deemed either
unlikely or unable to be determined by the outcome in the earlier
event.222
These multiple influences on corporate decisions and
decision-making heuristics affect corporate regulatory compliance, and
should therefore factor into regulators’ decisions about sanctions
imposed in an effort to minimize corporate wrongdoing.

215

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 40–41 (2002).
216
See id.
217
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541; see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28,
at 1078–79.
218
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541; see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 28,
at 1078–79.
219
Di Lorenzo, supra 192, at 283 n.84.
220
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment
of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 431 (1972); see also
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness,
in JUDGMENT UNDER CERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84, 97 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (“[R]esults reported in preceding studies provide
direct support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of events
by the degree to which these events are representative of a relevant model or
process.”).
221
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 220, at 431.
222
See id. at 466.
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Countrywide As a Test Case

The experience of Countrywide Financial illustrates the
multiple influences on corporate behavior that can lead to excessive
risk taking and willingness to ignore legal mandates.223
Countrywide operated in a business environment that
emphasized short-term profits and increasing market share.224 Prior to
2003, Countrywide’s loan offerings reflected a commitment to the
legal mandate to originate “safe” and “prudent” loans.225 After 2003,
Countrywide changed its former policy and “increasingly offered
‘innovative,’ riskier products.”226 Origination of riskier loan products
increased profits, stock price, and executive compensation.227 In
addition to the effect of higher profits on stock price, the industry view
was that increases in market share would also lead to increases in
Countrywide’s stock price.228 Due to the offering of “innovative”
mortgage products, Countrywide’s market share in the U.S. mortgage
market increased from 11.4 percent in December 2003 to 15.7 percent
in September 2006.229 By 2005, Countrywide had become the largest
mortgage lender in the United States, recognizing earnings of $2.1
billion, $2.4 billion, and $2 billion in its loan production divisions in
2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively.230 The $2.4 billion in earnings in
2005 represented an increase of 182 percent over earnings in 2002.231
Countrywide’s stock price increased 561 percent in the ten years

223

An earlier version of the Countrywide case study was presented in Di
Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 541–45.
224
Id. at 541–42; see also Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in
Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 216, 228 (2013).
225
12 C.F.R. § 160.101 (2016) (stating that Federal savings associations are
required to adopt real estate lending policies that are “consistent with safe and
sound banking practices” and that reflect “[p]rudent underwriting standards
. . .”); see Complaint at 7, SEC v. Mozilo, No. 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4,
2009).
226
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 542; see Gretchen Morgenson, How
Countrywide Covered the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2010), http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/10/17/business/17trial.html
[https://perma.cc/J4PVG42V].
227
Di Lorenzo, supra note 187, at 542.
228
See Complaint at 10–11, SEC v. Mozilo, No. 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4,
2009); Morgenson, supra note 226.
229
Complaint at 10, Mozilo, No. 09-03994.
230
Id. at 7.
231
Id. at 7–8.
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ending in December 2006.232 Based on increased profit, market share,
and stock price, Countywide CEO Angelo Mozilo received total
compensation of $391.9 million in the five years ending in 2008.233
Short-term profits and increased market share were realized
via lending products and practices that posed long-term, and
sometimes substantial, risks.234 These long-term risks were minimized
or ignored due to the interplay of cognitive influences, decisionmaking heuristics, and ego.235 One loan product that posed substantial
long-term risks was the payment option adjustable rate mortgage
(option ARM).236 By 2005, option ARMs accounted for 19 percent of
Countrywide’s loan volume, making it the largest option ARM lender
that year.237 A super-majority of Countrywide’s option ARMs were
“low documentation” loans in which the borrower did not fully
document income or assets.238
In the spring of 2006, e-mail messages from Mr. Mozilo
revealed he was very concerned about the delinquency risks posed by
such loans as borrowers faced payment shocks from resets.239
Nonetheless, he actively promoted the company’s option ARM loans
to investors at a Wall Street conference.240 This was understandable in
a corporate environment emphasizing short-term profits, since
Countrywide’s gross profit margin was more than 4 percent on option
232
See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
26,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/
business/yourmoney/26country.html [https://perma.cc/AN4P-EPQ2].
233
Agustino Fontevecchia, Mozilo Pays Record Penalty to Settle Securities
Fraud Cases, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2010), www.forbes.com/2010/10/15/mozilosec-fraud-equities-markets-securities.html [https://perma.cc/C4FQ-UCQA].
234
See generally FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE
RATE MORTGAGES (ARM) (2005) (providing an overview of adjustable-rate
mortgages).
235
Di Lorenzo, supra note 51, at 95.
236
See generally FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 234, at 2.
237
Ruth Simon & James Hagerty, Countrywide’s New Scare, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119318489086669202
[https://perma.cc/23RC-QRJV].
238
Id. (“Of the option ARMs it issued last year, 91% were ‘low-doc’
mortgages in which the borrower didn’t fully document income or assets,
according to UBS, compared with an industry average of 99% that year. In
2004, 78% of Countrywide’s option ARMs carried less than full
documentation.”).
239
See Complaint at 20, SEC v. Mozilo, No. 09-03994 (C.D. Cal. June 4,
2009).
240
Id. at 37.
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ARMs, double the 2 percent profit margin generated by standard loans
backed by the FHA.241 Securitized payment option ARM loans were
sold by Countrywide and other originators to investors at higher prices,
due to the higher interest rates they carried at reset and prepayment
penalties.242 In addition, payment option ARMs that were kept in
portfolio generated immediate phantom profits because banks were
able to report as current income the fully amortizing repayment
amount even when borrowers made minimum payments.243 At
Countrywide, such phantom income equaled $654 million in 2006 and
$1.26 billion in 2007.244 Future risks were minimized or ignored.245
The hope was that risks would be shifted to purchasers of its
mortgage-backed securities.246
Another risky underwriting practice was underwriting an
ARM based on payments due at the initial, low interest rate.247
Countrywide later admitted that almost 60 percent of borrowers for
whom it originated subprime hybrid ARMs would not have qualified
at the fully indexed rate, even if interest rates did not increase.248 In
other words, these borrowers would be unable to afford the loans
except in the short-term.249 Countrywide ignored this risk.250 These
underwriting practices, as well as the practice of underwriting no
documentation loans, increased short-term fee income from origination
fees and increased market share since more borrowers “qualified” for
such loan products.251
Countrywide’s increased underwriting of risky loan products
was also influenced by the personality and ego of Mr. Mozilo.252 Mr.
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Mozilo had been treated as an outsider by Wall Street’s investment
bankers who looked down on the flashy mortgage banker from Los
Angeles.253 By 2003, Countrywide had become the third-largest
residential loan originator in the U.S,254 and had a market share of 10
percent when no originator had a market share greater than 13
percent.255 Mr. Mozilo, however, wanted it to be number one, and
wanted to dazzle Wall Street investment bankers by capturing a market
share of at least 30 percent,256 a larger share than any company had
ever achieved.257 Mr. Mozilo announced the goal of 30 percent market
share at a Lehman Brothers Financial Services Conference in 2003.258
Once he publicly stated that goal, there was enormous pressure inside
Countrywide.259 The culture became: “[w]e got to do this.”260 To gain
market share, Countrywide expanded its offerings of loan products for
which more borrowers could “qualify,” such as no documentation
loans.261 By the end of 2004, Countrywide had surpassed Wells Fargo
as the largest residential loan originator in the United States.262
These risky but profitable underwriting practices were made in
a legal environment characterized by an imprecise legal mandate.
During the period in question, Countrywide’s legal mandate was to
adopt and adhere to real estate lending policies that were “consistent
with safe and sound banking practices” and reflected “prudent
underwriting standards.”263 In addition, risk assessment occurred in an
environment in which legal compliance was not aggressively
enforced.264 The multiple influences on Countrywide’s behavior,
including its skewed assessment of long-term risk, led it to ignore the
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legal mandate of “prudent” lending operations and “safe and sound”
products and practices.265
Countrywide’s actions from 2004 to 2007 reflect skewed risk
perception. Long-term risks to Countrywide were downplayed or
ignored by its corporate actors.266 It is sometimes assumed that the
decision to downplay risks was rational, because risks were eliminated
when the risky loans were sold to investors.267 In fact, this was not
always or completely the case. Countrywide kept the riskiest portion of
securitizations, the residuals, on its own balance sheet.268 By the end of
2006, it had $2.8 billion of residuals on its balance sheet, equaling 15
percent of its equity.269 Additionally, starting in 2005, it began to keep
some of its risky loans on its balance sheet. In 2005 and 2006,
Countrywide maintained a majority of the option ARMs it originated
in the investment portfolio of Countrywide Bank.270 Countrywide also
would be forced to repurchase some of the loans sold in the secondary
market due to the loans’ risky characteristics that did not meet the
underwriting requirements of some secondary market purchasers.271
As Countrywide originated riskier loan products, a smaller percentage
of loans that it did sell were eligible for sale on a nonrecourse basis.272
Recourse loans allow the purchaser of loans that were sold in the
secondary market to seek recourse against Countrywide when the
borrowers defaulted.273 However, the large short-term profits produced
by such loans caused Countrywide to ignore their long-term risks.274
Countrywide’s actions also evidence simplified decisionmaking. The mortgage crisis caused a significant number of lawsuits
to later be filed against Countrywide or its acquirer, Bank of
America.275 These lawsuits imposed substantial costs.276 However,
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when Countrywide’s loan practices were in place, the possibility of
substantial liability in future litigation depended on a complex mix of
factors.277 Substantial liability would require a substantial number of
defaults.278 In addition, the possible total cost of future lawsuits, both
private actions and government actions, was uncertain and subject to a
complex set of possibilities.279 Considerations that contribute to
uncertainty regarding the size and likelihood of litigation risks include:
the likelihood that an action would be initiated, the ability of a plaintiff
to avoid dismissal of the action, the size of a negotiated settlement, and
the ability to receive partial reimbursement of the settlement through
insurance and tax deductions.280 Simplified decision making would
cause the corporate actor to conclude the potential risk created through
such a complex interaction of variables is a low probability risk.281
This conclusion is one more likely to be drawn in light of the
significant profits generated by the activity in question.282
3.

Continued Regulatory Blindness in the
United States

The recent response of U.S. financial regulators to significant
and continuing violations of law has been to impose larger and larger
monetary sanctions.283 For example, in November 2013, the Justice
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Department announced a $13 billion settlement with J.P. Morgan
Chase, which included a $2 billion civil penalty.284 At the time, this
was the largest settlement with a single entity in U.S. history.285 The
settlement resolved federal and state civil claims arising out of
packaging, marketing, sales, and issuance of residential mortgage
backed securities (RMBS) prior to January 1, 2009.286 The Justice
Department has outlined its approach in its enforcement policy in the
RMBS cases.287 It seeks accountability, transparency and redress,288
and has noted that accountability has taken the form of recordbreaking penalties.289 The large penalties are imposed to ensure “the
penalty is [not] of such a level that it could be regarded by
shareholders and management as merely the ‘cost of doing
business.’”290
Similarly, in July 2014, the Justice Department announced a
$7 billion settlement with Citigroup to resolve RMBS claims,
including a $4 billion civil penalty.291 At the time, this was the largest
civil penalty under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA).292 Again, the Justice Department
emphasized that, “the size and scope of this resolution goes beyond
what could be considered the mere cost of doing business.”293 One
month later, the Justice Department announced a $16.65 billion
settlement with Bank of America to resolve RMBS claims, which
included a $5 billion penalty under FIRREA.294 The settlement is the
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largest civil settlement with a single entity in U.S. history, and the
penalty is the largest penalty ever imposed under FIRREA.295
In June 2014, the Justice Department announced an $8.9
billion settlement with BNP Paribas for illegally processing financial
transactions for countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions.296 FBI
Director James Comey explained “[t]he significant financial penalties
imposed on BNP Paribas sends a powerful deterrent message to any
company that places its profits ahead of its adherence to the law.”297
The Justice Department’s statements concerning all of these
settlements reflect a continuing embrace of rational decision making as
the touchstone of corporate decisions, namely the view that costbenefit evaluations are the primary determinant of corporate
decisions.298 They also reflect the view that there is a linear
relationship between the size of fines and long-term corporate
commitment to legal compliance.299 The penalties and statements
ignore the influence of cognitive barriers and complexity in future
compliance decisions.300
Corporate evaluations of recent enforcement actions may not
necessarily lead to greater commitment to legal compliance due, in
part, to the influence of the representativeness heuristic.301 The
representativeness heuristic can be outer-directed or inner-directed.302
In its outer-directed manifestation, a corporate actor evaluates external
actions directed at the corporation, such as monetary sanctions
imposed for legal violations, in light of the external environment in
which the sanction is imposed.303 For example, the recent imposition
of very large sanctions against the financial services industry can be
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characterized as primarily a response to the 2008 mortgage crisis.304
The settlements related to the 2008 mortgage crisis all emphasize that
the banks’ conduct caused a crisis in the U.S. housing market that led
to staggering losses to U.S. consumers and an international financial
crisis.305 The size of the sanctions is deemed to be a unique response to
this crisis.306 The outer-directed representative heuristic was witnessed
in the past with respect to the substantial number of lawsuits, including
criminal prosecutions following the savings and loan crisis.307 The
likelihood of significant sanctions imposed for future wrongdoing will
be judged in light of similarity or dissimilarity solely with a course of
conduct that led to hundreds of billions of dollars of losses to U.S.
consumers and the U.S. economy.308
Even if a comparison is made to a broader set of violations of
law and resultant sanctions, namely sanctions for conspiracies to fix
the LIBOR and foreign exchange rates and violations of money
laundering or economic sanctions laws, it is likely that industry
members will judge other future violations as dissimilar. The large
number of industry members involved in the violations, and the
importance of money laundering and economic sanctions laws to U.S.
government officials, all limit the conclusion that these cases are
similar to other, future legal violations.309 Money laundering or
economic sanction violations will be deemed not representative of
most future violations.310 Therefore, future violations will be judged
unlikely to lead to similarly large sanctions. The possible fallacy in this
assessment is that it is based on judgments regarding
representativeness, and not the true underlying determinants of the
likelihood and size of future sanctions sought in enforcement actions.
If the government’s enforcement policy has changed, such that it is
304
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 294 (reporting that the
financial crisis was “precipitated by the unlawful conduct of Bank of
America, Merrill Lynch and Countrywide”).
305
E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 294.
306
E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 24; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 294.
307
See Two Financial Crises Compared, supra note 70 (showcasing the
increase in criminal regulatory referrals after the savings and loans crisis).
308
See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 294 (stating
that RMBS purpose is to investigate fraud that led to the financial crisis).
309
See generally Michael Levi, Money Laundering and Its Regulation, 582
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 181, 182 (2002).
310
See generally id.

250

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

VOL. 36

more likely to seek substantial sanctions for all legal violations, the
possible deterrent influence of the new policy will be short circuited by
the representativeness heuristic.311
The representativeness heuristic can also be inner-directed.312
In this manifestation it affects internal corporate evaluations of the
similarity or dissimilarity of actions taken by various departments or
individuals within a corporation.313 Tracey McDermott, director of
enforcement and financial crime at the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) explained: “[i]t is a source of some concern to me that firms are
still not reading across the root causes of misconduct in one area and
ensuring that the same issues don’t exist in another.”314 Accordingly,
in both its outer-directed and inner-directed manifestations, the
representativeness heuristic is likely to limit the deterrent effect of
regulatory sanctions.
4.

Modest Recognition in the United
Kingdom

Regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom have revisited
their enforcement policies in the wake of the 2008 mortgage crisis.315
In doing so, they have recognized behavioral influences on corporate
decision-makers.316
The FSA and its successors, the FCA and the Prudential
Regulation Authority, have embraced increased penalties as a
mechanism to deter further breaches of legal standards by wrongdoers
and deter other persons from committing similar breaches.317
311
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However, they have also begun to recognize multiple influences on
corporate behavior beyond the influence of financial penalties,
including corporate culture and behavioral influences.318 Thus, the
FSA acknowledged that rational decision making did not fully and
accurately predict and determine corporate outcomes.319 It noted:
There are . . . insights from behavioural economics,
cognitive psychology and neuroscience, which reveal
that people often do not make decisions in the rational
front of brain . . . assumed in neoclassical economics,
but make decisions which are rooted in the instinctive
part of the brain, and which at the collective level are
bound to produce herd effects and thus irrational
momentum swings.”320
Among other cognitive influences recognized is the representativeness
heuristic, with officials acknowledging that both bankers and
regulators have “failed to learn the lessons of history,” each time
saying, “it is different.”321 It remains to be seen whether or how this
recognition shapes enforcement actions.
IV.

Conclusion and Next Step

Will recent, large financial sanctions, including large civil
penalties, imposed by U.S. regulators deter future wrongdoing by the
firms subject to the sanctions and by other firms in the industry?
Behavioral decision theory and complexity theory advise that there are
many factors that will influence future corporate assessments and
decisions on legal compliance.322 Corporate culture influences
corporate decision making as much as government policies and
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actions.323 Corporate culture is shaped by internal and external market
conditions, including cognitive influences, decision-making heuristics,
and accepted business models that perform cost-benefit evaluations
with an eye toward maximizing short-term profits.324 Cognitive
influences and heuristics shape corporate assessments of risk,
including the risk of legal sanctions for noncompliance.325
Moreover, nongovernmental and governmental influences are
dynamic. They change over time—a change that is not identical in
each firm—and also interact differently within each firm. Whether a
large fine today will lead to legal compliance next year or years later in
the same firm, and other firms in the industry, is therefore
unpredictable.
To achieve the goal of deterrence, U.S. regulators must take
the first step of recognizing the multiple influences on corporate
decisions, including cognitive influences and heuristics. This is a step
regulators in the United Kingdom have begun to take.326 In turn,
regulators need to modify enforcement policies to reflect such multiple
influences. Regulators must recognize that an increase in monetary
penalties may not alone lead to consistent or resolute commitment to
legal compliance. The challenge in the effort to achieve greater legal
compliance is to determine how to modify enforcement policy to
reflect the complex, dynamic nature of corporate decisions. The aim is
to modify enforcement policy in such a manner that cognitive
influences, including heuristics, incline the corporate actor toward
greater commitment to corporate compliance.
One possible change, which could be imposed in addition to
other sanctions, is an enforcement policy that makes greater use of
market-based sanctions such as suspensions directed at the
corporation.327 The suspension might be of a particular product,
process, or line of business, and would alter the immediate
assessments of risk. Faced with a business model emphasizing the
importance of short-term profits and a decision-making heuristic of
skewed risk perception, suspensions in lines of business, products or
operations transform profits from primarily a benefit of noncompliance
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to a significant cost of noncompliance.328 The length of any suspension
would be uncertain, magnifying the significance of the loss in a costbenefit evaluation that embraces cognitive influences.
Evidence of the effectiveness of this type of sanction is
provided by the U.S. experience with the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA).329 The CRA, enacted in 1977, requires banking institutions
to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including low- and
moderate-income communities.330 The sanction authorized by the Act
allows the governing agency to deny any “application for a deposit
facility,” which includes an application to open new branches or to
merge or acquire the assets of any regulated financial institution.331
Through 1988, banks largely ignored the CRA’s requirements and
rarely faced sanction. However, beginning in 1989, and with greater
frequency during the Clinton administration, the federal banking
regulators increasingly and with greater consistency denied
applications for expansion on the part of banking institutions with poor
CRA ratings.332 This sanction, similar to the sanction of corporate
suspension, had a direct impact on bank profits. The result was a
dramatic commitment by banking institutions to CRA lending in a
market in which banks sought expansion through interstate branching,
and industry mergers and acquisitions. As of 1985, U.S. banks had
committed $3.7 billion to CRA lending.333 By 1993, such
commitments exceeded $30 billion, increased to more than $397
billion by the first quarter of 1998, and reached $1 trillion in the fall of
1998.334 This sanction demonstrates the dynamic interaction of
government action and market forces when risk is assessed by
corporate actors through a lens subject to cognitive and heuristic
influence.
Imposition of corporate product, operations, or line of
business suspensions for legal violations is a modification in
328
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enforcement policy that has been largely rejected by federal regulators
in the United States,335 although federal regulators have recently
occasionally utilized this enforcement measure when faced with
violations of earlier settlements or recidivist behavior.336 It is a change
in enforcement policy that has been embraced by regulators in the
United Kingdom,337 and has been imposed by New York State’s
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financial regulator.338 However, for this enforcement measure to be
effective, consistency in resort to suspensions is necessary to avoid the
effects of simplified decision making and the representativeness
heuristic.
Consistent resort to suspensions is one of several changes in
enforcement policy that proper recognition of complexity and
cognitive influences on corporate behavior may justify. The ideal
would be to modify enforcement measures in such a manner that they
interact with the many influences on corporate behavior so as to
incline the corporate decision maker toward greater commitment to
legal compliance. How to best accomplish this goal becomes the
subject of further study.
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